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THE REGULATION OF RECOMBINANT DNA 
RESEARCH: THE ALTERNATIVE OF 
LOCAL CONTROL 
David P. Rosenblatt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a nation which prides itself on being a world leader in scientific, 
technological, and academic achievement, and embraces the concept 
of free speech and expression, the notion of prohibiting or restricting 
scientific inquiry is a discomforting thought. l However, the newest 
biological technology-recombinant DNA2-has caused scientists3 
and laymen4 alike to call for some degree of restriction over this field 
of research. This outcry has created a need to strike a balance be-
tween protecting the freedom of scientific inquiry and protecting 
public safety by regulating recombinant DNA research. 
• Citations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIROMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. G. Wald, quoted in Berger, Government Regulation qr the Pursuit qr Knowledge: Recombi-
nant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83, 84 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Berger]. Wald noted 
that our nation's morality traditionally has encouraged scientific inquiry to proceed without 
restriction. 
2. Simply speaking, recombinant DNA involves isolating and combining genes of one 
organism with those of another to form a new organism never before known to nature. For 
descriptions of the technology, see Galston, Here Come the Clones, 84 NAT. HIST_ 72-77 (1975); 
Fox, Change of Genes, 49 CHEMISTRY 22-23 (1976); Science's Newest "Magic"-A Blessing or a 
Curse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 12, 1976, at 34-35; Shaping Life in the Lab, TIME, Mar. 
9, 1981, at 50-59. 
3. In an action described as "unprecedented in the history of science," a group of noted 
scientists called for a moratorium on recombinant DNA research until the environmental 
hazards of the research were determined_ Bennett & Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists, 
ATLANTIC, Feb. 1971, at 43, 44. 
4. The lay community's response to recombinant DNA research is typified by events in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts where public hearings were held to discuss the advantages and 
hazards of the research in response to Harvard University's plan to construct a new laboratory 
for high risk genetic experiments. See infra text at notes 237-41 . 
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The debate over regulation of recombinant DNA has become vocal 
and controversial not only because .of the first amendment tensions 
involved,5 but also because the potential benefits and risks associated 
with the technology are profound. Using recombinant techniques, 
researchers are developing therapeutic drugs such as human in-
sulin-a growth hormone; and interferon-an antivirus drug6 which 
may lead to a cure for certain forms of cancer. Scientists are using 
the technology to develop improved processes in making antibiotics. 7 
Genetic recombinations also have wide applications in the chemical 
and energy industries.8 For example, through recombinant technol-
ogy, researchers have created ethylene oxide, a compound used as 
the basis for making many chemicals, and yeast bacteria, which may 
enable producers of gasohol to eliminate the distillation process.9 
On the other hand, the potentially deleterious effects of recombin-
ant research have alarmed researchers and the public and prompt-
ed a call for regulation.10 The major danger associated with recombin-
ant DNA technology is that these new organisms will escape into the 
environment.l1 Because these organisms have never existed before 
in nature, other living organisms have not had time to develop 
defenses and immunities to the new bacteria.12 As a result, some 
scientists have predicted that the release of recombinants-with 
5. For a discussion of the first amendment right to freedom of scientific inquiry, see Berger, 
supra note 1, at 100-05. Berger describes the conflict as one between the freedom of experi-
mentation and the police power of the state to protect the community from the hazards of the 
experimentation. 
6. Wade, Recombinant DNA: Warming Upfor Big Payoff, 206 SCIENCE 663 (1979); see also, 
Parisi, Gene Industry Hails Court Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1980, at D 16, col. 4. 
7. Wade, supra note 6. 
8. Parisi, supra note 6. 
9. Id. 
10. The only federal regulation of recombinant DNA research is a series of guidelines prom-
ulgated by the National Institutes of Health, a branch of the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (1978); 45 Fed. Reg. 6,724 (1980); 
45 Fed. Reg. 25,366 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 77,372 (1980). These guidelines are discussed in 
detail in text at notes 154-233 infra. 
Maryland and New York have adopted the NIH guidelines as state law. See MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 43, §§ 898-910 (1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3220 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). 
On the local level, Cambridge (discussed in text at notes 234-310 infra), Boston, Waltham, 
and Amherst, Massachusetts, and Berkeley, California have passed ordinances regulating the 
research. 
Congress has considered bills in 1977 and 1978 for regulating the research; however, none 
made it to the floor of the House or Senate for a vote. H.R. 11192, 95th Congo 2d Sess. (1978); 
H.R. 7897, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). 
11. Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, CURRENT, Nov. 1976, at 25. See generally 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Peoples Business Commission, submitted in behalf of the Petitioner in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
12. Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, CURRENT, Nov. 1976, at 25. 
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largely undetermined properties-will result in new animal and plant 
diseases, new forms of cancer, and novel epidemics.1s At present, 
there is no way of ascertaining how recombinant molecules will af-
fect other forms of life or the ecosystem. 
In the past year or so, the debate over the safety and regulation of 
recombinant DNA has assumed added significance. A problem once 
associated solely with the activities of the university research 
laboratory now involves industrial laboratories as well.14 Recombin-
ant DNA experimentation is presently being carried out on a wide 
scale in at least a dozen private laboratories with the goal of 
manufacturing genetic products for profit. 15 Private genetic 
engineering is now a highly competitive, multimillion dollar in-
dustry.16 The commercial future of private DNA engineering has 
been compared to the electronics industry of a decade ago.17 
In June, 1980, the Supreme Court added another factor to the 
DNA issue. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,18 the Court held that the 
United States Patent Office can issue patents on man-made 
organisms. Presumably, researchers who manufacture a new 
organism through recombinant DNA techniques can now protect 
their proprietary interests in that organism with a government pat-
ent. 
This article will discuss the regulation of recombinant DNA in light 
of recent developments in the recombinant DNA debate, namely, the 
Chakrabarty decision and the growth of the private genetic 
engineering industry. The article begins with a discussion of the 
issues in Chakrabarty and the factors which led the Court to decide 
as it did. Second, the growth of the private genetic industry and the 
likely impact of the Chakrabarty case on this growth will be 
documented. Third, the existing regulation of recombinant DNA 
research will be analyzed to see if it provides sufficient protection 
from the potential hazards of the research. Finally, the recombinant 
13. [d. at 26. Scientists have been reluctant to identify the risks of the research with any 
more specificity. At present, the risks associated with recombinant DNA are purely 
hypothetical. There have been no recorded outbreaks of recombinant DNA molecules into the 
environment which would enable scientists to ascertain their deleterious effects more precise-
ly. 
14. Parisi, supra note 6. See also E.F. Hutton, BIOTECHNOLOGY, Nov. 1979, at 1. This is a 
magazine describing the development of industrial recombinant DNA laboratories and the at-
tractiveness of investing in the technology. 
15. Parisi, supra note 6. 
16. Powledge, DNA Research Gets Down to Business, NATION, Oct. 1979, at 326. 
17. [d. 
18. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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DNA ordinance in Cambridge, Massachusetts will be discussed to 
demonstrate how it can serve as a model for states and localities 
desiring more control over recombinant DNA research being under-
taken in their communities. 
II. THE CHAKRABARTY CASE 
A. Background 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty19 involved the claim of General Electric 
scientist, Dr. Ananda M. Chakrabarty, to a patent for a 
Pseudomonas bacterium, which he developed using genetic engineer-
ing techniques. 2o The organism was developed in response to a 
significant social problem, oil spills in bodies of water. The 
Pseudomonas bacteria are useful in cleaning up these spills. They 
break down and degrade crude oil into simpler substances and then 
ingest the substances. The bacteria, in turn, become food for other 
aquatic life.21 
Dr. Chakrabarty sought patents for the process of producing the 
bacteria, for an inoculum composed of a carrier material capable of 
floating on water, and for the bacteria themselves.22 The Patent Ex-
aminer granted the claims to the process and the inoculum but 
denied the claim to the bacteria.23 The Examiner's decision rested on 
the principle that bacteria are something occurring in nature and, 
therefore, unpatentable.24 The Board of Appeals of the Patent Office 
affirmed the Patent Examiner's denial of the patent for the bacteria 
on a different ground25-that the bacteria are unpatentable because 
they are alive.26 The Board reasoned that section 101 of the Patent 
19. [d. 
20. The techniques used by Dr. Chakrabarty are explained in The New Biology, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC, 1976, at 374-75. See also Brief for Respondent at 6, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
21. Brief for Respondent at 6. 
22. [d. at 6-7. 
23. [d. at 7. Chakrabarty's initial application was Serial No. 260,563 entitled 
"Microorganisms Having Multiple, Compatible Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids and 
Preparation Thereof." 
24. Brief for Respondent at 7. See also id. App. I-A (containing excerpts from the "Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure," which contains the statement that "a thing occurring in 
nature, which is substantially unaltered, is not a 'manufacture' "). 
25. The Board disagreed with the examiner's conclusion that the bacteria were products of 
nature, finding that, because the Pseudonomas contains two or more different energy-
generating plasmids, they are not naturally occurring. 447 U.S. 303, 306 n.3. 
26. Brief for Respondent at 8. 
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Act,27 which permits patents for a "manufacture" and "composition 
of matter,"28 was not intended to include living organisms.29 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCP A), in Application 
of Chakrabarty, 30 rejected this interpretation of section 101, holding 
that the bacteria cannot be excluded from patent protection solely 
because they are alive.31 The government appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court and the Court granted certiorari on October 29, 
1979.32 The issue in the Chakrabarty case was whether a living 
organism, made by man in a laboratory, can be considered as pat-
entable subject matter within the meaning of section 101 of the Pat-
ent Act. The arguments before the Supreme Court rested mainly on 
congressional intent in enacting section 101, on public policy con-
siderations in allowing patent protection for man-made organisms, 
and on the practice of the Patent Office in handling previous applica-
27. 35 u.s.c. § 101 (1976). 
28. Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 
29. This interpretation of the Patent Act was made by the government when the case was 
before the Supreme Court. See infra text at notes 51-52. 
30. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
31. The court relied on its recent decision in Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 
1977) in which the court approved a patent for a living bacteria discovered in the Arizona soil 
which is used in producing an antibiotic. At the time of the court's Chakrabarty decision, the 
government was in the process of appealing Bergy. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 438 
U.S. 902 (1978), vacated the court's Bergy ruling and remanded the Bergy case for further con-
sideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The patents court also vacated its 
ruling in Chakrabarty and consolidated the two cases for review. 
It is unclear why the Supreme Court thought that the Flook case would control Bergy and 
Chakrabarty. In Flook, the Court denied the patent application for use of this formula in the 
catalytic conversion process. The Court noted that, while § 101 does permit patents for 
discovering a new process, a line must be drawn between a patentable process and an unpatent-
able abstract principle. The Court's determination that the formula is an unpatentable formula 
rested on the fact that the catalytic conversion process and use of alarm limits to trigger 
alarms are well known, and thus the respondents had simply discovered a "new and presum-
ably better method for calculating alarm limit values." 437 U.S. at 395-396. 
On remand, the lower court affirmed its earlier rulings that Bergy's and Chakrabarty's 
organisms constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of § 
101 and were not unpatentable solely because they are living. Brief for Respondent at 9. The 
court noted that, unlike the Flook case, the patent applications involved in Bergy and Chakra-
barty did not involve a formula, algorithm, or law of nature, and thus the court concluded that 
Flook was not useful in providing rules of patent law to the cases at bar. 
32. 444 U.S. 924 (1979). Certiorari was granted for the Bergy case as well which had been 
consolidated for review. While awaiting review by the Supreme Court, Bergy cancelled his 
claim to his bacterium and, on Jan. 14, 1980, the claim was dismissed by the Court as moot. 444 
U.S. 1028 (1980). Chakrabarty's claim remained to be decided by the Court. 
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tions for patents on living organisms. The following subsections 
outline the major arguments of the parties and the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in reaching its decision. 
B. The Government's Argument 
The government began its argument by urging the Court to inter-
pret the Patent Act narrowly33 and refrain from extending patent 
protection into new areas such as organisms made by genetic 
engineering not previously contemplated by Congress.34 The govern-
ment urged that any expansion of patent protection should be done 
by Congress since Congress is best equipped to weigh the "difficult 
and controversial policy questions"35 involved in patenting living 
organisms and can "tailor the precise limits of the protections 
available and the statutory requirements for obtaining those protec-
tions to reflect the particular attributes of the forms protected."36 
The government further argued that the denial of a patent was par-
ticularly appropriate in this case since Dr. Chakrabarty's discovery 
involved genetic engineering which is closely related to recombinant 
DNA37 and, therefore, raised ethical and public safety questions con-
cerning the desirability of permitting someone to own life forms pro-
duced through these techniques.3s This safety issue was also put 
forth in an amicus brief by the People's Business Commission. 39 
They argued that the patentability of genetic products will increase 
incentives for development of the technology without proper con-
sideration for safety.40 
33. The government was relying on language in Deepsouth Packing Company v. Lastrom 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972), in which the Court stated that because of the nation's 
"historical antipathy to monopoly" the patent laws are strictly construed. Brief for Petitioner 
at 12, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
34. In Parker v. Flook, the Court warned that the judiciary "must proceed cautiously when 
we are asked to tend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." 437 U.S. 584, 
596 (1978). 
35. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
36. Id. 
37. While Dr. Chakrabarty's discovery was made using genetic engineering, the govern-
ment did concede that he did not use recombinant DNA techniques. Brief for Petitioner at 
17-18. Dr. Chakrabarty's process involved migrating and fusing plasmids, a complete 
hereditary unit, from four cells to create a new bacteria. See Brief for Respondent at 4-5, 26. 
Unlike recombinant DNA processes, the splitting and recombining of genes outside the host 
organism does not take place. See infra text at notes 118-33 for discussion of how the 
Chakrabarty case will affect recombinant DNA research. 
38. Brief for Petitioner at 18-20. 
39. The Peoples Business Commission is a Washington, D.C. based, non-profit educational 
foundation designed to raise public awareness on economic and technological trends in the 
United States. The Commission has criticized genetic engineering as not in the public interest. 
Amicus Curiae Brief for Peoples Business Commission at 1, 2. 
40. Id. at 2, 5. 
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The government next argued that Congress, in enacting section 
101, did not intend to extend patent protection to living things. 41 
They adduced as proof the subsequent passage of the Plant Patent 
Act of 193042 and the Plant Variety Protection Act,43 which ex-
tended patent coverage to certain asexual and sexually reproduced 
plants. The government reasoned that if living organisms were 
already patentable subject matter then the Plant Patent Act and 
Plant Variety Protection Act would be redundant. It concluded that 
the only logical reason for these two acts was the extension of the 
patent laws into areas not previously covered.44 A letter from then 
Secretary of Agriculture Hyde appended to the House and Senate 
Committee reports on the Plant Patent Act45 supported this inter-
pretation: "This purpose [encouraging the improvement of certain 
cultivated plants] is sought to be accomplished by bringing the 
reproduction of such newly bred or found plants under the patent 
laws which at the present time are understood to cover only inven-
tions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature."46 The govern-
ment also cited the Commissioner of Patents who supported amend-
ing the patent laws to permit protection for plants resulting "from 
human efforts," as "the present patent law does not make it possible 
to grant patents" for themY 
The government noted that, in these two instances, Congress has 
amended the Patent Act to provide for the patentability of certain 
living things-namely, various types of hybrid plants.48 Congress, 
however, despite the recommendations of the American Bar 
Association49 and various writers on patent law,50 had failed to pass 
legislation to broaden the scope of living things which may be 
41. Brief for Petitioner at 21-37_ 
42_ The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). 
43. The Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404(a) (1976). 
44. Brief for Petitioner at 22-24. 
45. H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. app. A (1930); S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d 
Sess. app. A (1930), cited in Brief for Petitioner at 25. 
46. [d. 
47. Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 
(1930), cited in Brief for Petitioner at 35. 
48. See supra text at notes 42-43. 
49. Brief for Petitioner at 14 (citing the 1966 ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT 
LAW SECTION, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 59, 74 (1967), and the 1969 ABA PATENT, 
TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW SECTION, COMMITTEE REPORTS 123 (1979)). The 1969 COM-
MITTEE REPORTS explicitly advocated the extension of patent protection to micro-organisms: 
"[t]here is growing concern by many that the micro-biological art is ready to enjoy the fruits of 
the patent system [and that] [t]here is also a growing belief that the micro-biological art needs 
stimulation of the kind offered by a patent system." 
50. Brief for Petitioner at 15 n.13 (citing Dienner, Patents for Biological Specimens and 
Products, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 286, 290 (1953); and Rossman, The Preparation and Prosecu-
tion of Plant Patent Applications, 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 632 (1935)). 
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patented beyond the coverage of those two acts. The government, 
therefore, argued that there is no "clear and certain signal from 
Congress"51 regarding the patentability of micro-organisms and, 
thus, the judiciary is foreclosed from extending patent protection in-
to this area.52 
Finally, the government took issue with the CCPA which stated 
that the Patent Office regularly grants patents on living 
organisms. 53 The government maintained that the patents on living 
organisms mentioned by the court and the respondent represented 
aberrations in the Office's policy with "minimal precedential signifi-
cance, since they were only isolated actions of lower level employees 
[the 1,000-plus Examiners], made on applications neither contested 
nor reviewed."54 In a reply brief, the government stated that among 
the list of sixty-eight patents on livng organisms alleged by the 
respondent, only three clearly involved claims to the organisms 
themselves. 55 
C. Dr. Chakrabarty's Argument 
Dr. Chakrabarty began his response by noting that the judiciary 
has consistently ruled in favor of patents on living organisms. 56 He 
relied on Funk Bros. Co. v. Kalo Co. 57 for judicial approval of the 
patentability of living things. In Funk, the applicant sought a patent 
on a mixture of strains of bacteria useful in assisting the growth of 
leguminous plants. The Court denied the patent on the ground that 
the discovery was a natural phenomenon; a discovery of the fact that 
certain strains of naturally occurring bacteria can be mixed together 
51. Brief for Petitioner at 21 (citin.q Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978), in which the 
Court referred to the principle enunciated in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Lastrom Corp., 406 
U.S. 518, 531: that judicial approval of extension of patent protection into a new field requires 
"a clear and certain signal from Congress"). 
52. Brief for the Petitioner at 21. As a further indication that Congress did not intend to permit 
patents for Dr. Chakrabarty's bacteria, the government relied on the language of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act which explicitly excludes bacteria from the coverage of the Act. The 
Act provides: "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than 
fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, ... shall be 
entitled to plant variety protection therefore." 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976). The government 
found no explanation for this exclusion in the legislative history but did argue that "it cannot 
fairly be read as supporting the conclusion that the exemption was intended to preserve an 
assumed pre-existing patentability of bacteria under the general patent law." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 27. 
53. Brief for Petitioner at 38-39. 
54. [d. at 39. 
55. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3. 
56. Brief for Respondent at 12-16. 
57. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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for a specific beneficial use.58 Chakrabarty emphasized that nowhere 
in the opinion did the Court mention that the bacteria were unpatent-
able because they were alive; the opinion rested on the fact that the 
mixture was a natural phenomenon. 59 
Similarly, in American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co. 60 the 
Supreme Court denied a patent on fruit which contained a borax 
coating to retard spoilage. The Court found that the coating did not 
sufficiently change the form, quality, or property of the fruit to con-
vert it from a product of nature to a manufacture.61 Again the Court 
did not contend that the fruit was unpatentable because it was 
alIve.62 
Dr. Chakrabarty also argued that the policy and practice of the Pat-
ent Office has been to grant patents on living organisms.63 He noted 
that certain classifications of patents established by the office con-
tain explicit reference to a host of living organisms which can be 
patented.64 Pursuant to these classifications, the Patent Office has 
granted patents on hundreds of living organisms.65 Further, Dr. 
Chakrabarty pointed out that, in the Patent Office's "Manual of Pat-
ent Examining Procedure,"66 the subject matter considered un-
patentable under section 101 includes "Printed Matter," "Naturally 
Occurring Article," "Method of Doing Business," and "Scientific 
Principle."67 The manual does not mention any proscription against 
living organisms.68 
Dr. Chakrabarty responded to the government's policy argument 
that patenting these types of organisms can only increase the 
hazards associated with recombinant DNA 69 by pointing out that his 
process did not involve recombinant DNA. He concluded that the 
government's reliance on policy arguments against technology not 
58. Id. at 13!. 
59. Brief for Respondent at 13-14. 
60. 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
61. Id. at 12. 
62. Brief for Respondent at 14. 
63. Id. at 16-25. 
64. Among the classes referred to by Dr. Chakrabarty were Class 424: "Whole Live 
Microorganism or Virus Containing"; Class 195: "Ferment containing products ... , Living 
fungi-containing." Brief for Respondent at 16-17. 
65. Id. at 18-22 (containing descriptions of some of the patents granted which include living 
organisms). 
66. UNITED STATES PATf;NT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE cited in 
Brief for Respondent at app. I-A. 
67. UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL (W PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 706.03(j) 
cited in Brief for Respondent at app. I-A. 
68. Brief for Respondent at 17. 
69. See supra text at notes 38-40. 
/ 
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used by him "demonstrates how far they must go to attempt to 
justify their policy change toward refusal of patents on living micro-
organisms."70 Nevertheless, he noted that the dangers once 
associated with recombinant DNA research had diminished consider-
ably71 and stressed that the Court should not take any steps which 
might inhibit the development of such a beneficial technology.72 
Having argued that section 101 does not prohibit the patentability 
of living organisms,73 Dr. Chakrabarty argued that his invention 
constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the 
meaning of the section.74 He relied mainly on American Fruit 
Growers75 which accepted the definition of manufacture as "the pro-
duction of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving 
to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, 
whether by hand-labor or by machinery."76 Chakrabarty argued that 
his invention satisfied this test since the process used created an 
organism with a new name (Pseudonomas), with a new form (the fu-
sion of four plasmids never before combined in an organism), and 
with new properties (the ability to degrade a variety of different 
components of crude oil).77 
In addition, Chakrabarty used the test provided by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in P.E. Sharpless Co. v. Crawford Farms78 to 
show that the Pseudonomas bacterium satisfied the requirements for 
a composition of matter. In Sharpless, the court stated that "a patent-
able composition of matter may well result or be formed by the inter-
mixture of two or more ingredients, which develop a different or ad-
ditional property or properties which the several ingredients in-
dividually do not possess in common."79 Dr. Chakrabarty noted that 
the Pseudonomas bacterium is formed by combining two or more 
plasmids, creating a bacterium with a property possessed by none of 
the ingredients-namely, the capacity to degrade multiple com-
ponents of crude oil. 80 
70. Brief for Respondent at 26. 
71. [d. at 29-30. The respondent was mainly relying on the 1978 revision of the NIH 
Guidelines which significantly relaxed the restrictions on the research originally imposed in 
1976. See infra text at notes 172-75. 
72. Brief for Respondent at 31. 
73. See supra text at notes 56-68. 
74. Brieffor Respondent at 37-54. 
75. 283 U.S. 1, 12 (1931). See supra text at notes 60-61. 
76. 283 U.S. 1, 12 (1931). See also Brief for Respondent at 39 (citing 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931». 
This test was also used in Steinfur Patents Corp. v. Beyer, 62 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1932). 
77. Brief for Respondent at 40. 
78. 287 F. 655 (2d Cir. 1923). 
79. [d. at 658, cited in Brief for Respondent at 41. 
80. Brief for Respondent at 41. 
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Chakrabarty concluded his argument by rejecting the 
government's position that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 indicates 
the general unpatentability of living organisms.81 First, he pointed 
out that the Plant Patent Act was passed to reverse the general 
perception that plants are products of nature, not man-made, and 
thus cannot qualify for patent protection.82 This perception was 
based largely on the Commissioner of Patent's decision in Ex Parte 
LatimerB3 in which the Commissioner denied a patent application for 
parts of pine needles because the applicant's mere extraction of the 
components did not convert the discovery from a product of nature 
to a patentable manufacture.84 In that case, the Commissioner did 
note that if the applicant had processed the needles a step further 
and given them new properties or functions the invention would 
result in a patentable product. 85 The respondents concluded that 
"[u]nder the rationale of Latimer, it appears that the work of the 
plant breeder did not qualify for a patent because there was insuffi-
cient change in the plant caused by man"86 and, thus, "it became an 
accepted tenet of patent law that plants were not patentable."87 
The 1930 Plant Patent Act, according to Chakrabarty, merely 
amended the patent laws to give incentive to breeders by allowing 
these products of nature88 to receive patent protection. The respond-
ent argued that the legislative history confirms that plants were 
previously unpatentable because they were perceived as products of 
nature. The Commissioner of Patents' testimony and Committee 
reports are devoid of reference to the living nature of plants.89 
Chakrabarty argued that his invention bears no relation to the con-
siderations which prompted the Plant Patent Act since it is a 
bacterium, not a plant, and was created solely through the work of 
man, not by nature.90 He supported his conclusion that the Plant Pat-
ent Act had no effect on the patentability of micro-organisms with 
evidence that, prior to and after 1930, the Patent Office did grant 
patents on a variety of micro-organisms.91 
81. See supra text at notes 42-52. 
82. Brief for Respondent at 51. 
83. Dec. Com. Pet. 123 (1889). The case is discussed in Brief for Respondent at 42-44. 
84. Brief for Respondent at 43. 
85. [d. (citing Dec. Com. Pat. 123, 127 (1889)). 
86. [d. at 44. 
87. [d. at 45. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 47. 
90. [d. at 45. 
91. [d. at 50-52 (containing a list of patents on micro-organisms granted by the Patent Of-
fice). 
Concerning the government's argument that the Plant Variety Protection Act which 
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D. Reasoning of the Court 
In affirming the CCPA, the Court found Dr. Chakrabarty's work 
to be a "manufacture" within the meaning of section 101 of the Pat-
ent Act.92 The Court noted that the definition of manufacture is to be 
given wide scope including "anything under the sun which is made 
by man."93 The Court agreed with Chakrabarty's contention that his 
micro-organism satisfies the tests94 for a patentable manufacture: 
"the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly dif-
ferent characteristics from any found in nature. . . . His discovery 
is not nature's handiwork but his own; accordingly it is patentable 
subject matter under section 101."96 
The Court rejected the government's argument that passage of 
the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act 
would have been unnecessary if living things were already patent-
able.96 Reviewing the patent history of plants, 97 the Court found that 
the Acts were passed because of the common perception that plants, 
even those bred by man, were products of nature and, therefore, un-
patentable.98 Another obstacle to patent protection prior to 1930 
was the strict written description requirement in the Patent Act99 
which was difficult to satisfy since plants cultivated by a 
breeder differed considerably in color and size. The 1930 Plant Pat-
ent Act resolved this difficulty by relaxing the requirement to "a 
description ... as complete as it is reasonably possible."loo 
specifically excluded bacteria, thus indicating their patentability (this argument is discussed at 
note 52 supra), Chakrabarty argued that the explicit exclusion of bacteria merely reflected 
congressional recognition that bacteria were not considered plants under the 1930 Act. Brief 
for Respondent at 53. To establish that the 1970 Act was not intended to change the already 
existing patentability of bacteria, citation was made to the Senate Committee report which 
stated: "The Committee accordingly has examined S. 3070 and finds that it does not alter pro-
tection currently available within the patent system." S. REP. No. 1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 
(1970). cited in Brief for Respondent at 53. 
92. 447 U.S. at 307-17. 
93. [d. at 309. The Court was quoting the Committee reports accompanying the 1952 
recodification ofthe Patent Act. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
94. The tests referred to are the American Fruit Growers test (see supra text at notes 
60-61,75-76; and a similar test proposed in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
95. 447 U.S. at 310. 
96. [d. at 310-11. This argument advanced by the government is mentioned in text at notes 
41-52 supra. 
97. The Court was mainly relying on Ex Parte Latimer discussed in text at notes 83-87 
supra. 
98. 447 U.S. at 311. 
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). 
100. [d. § 162 (1976), cited in 447 U.S. at 312. 
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The Court dismissed the government's reference to Secretary 
Hyde's letter, which stated that living organisms were unpatent-
able,lOl on the ground that his comments were not controlling and 
were beyond his area of competence.102 On the contrary, the Court 
found mention in the Plant Patent Act's Committee reports103 of the 
fact that the crucial distinction for section 101 patentability was not 
between living and inanimate inventions as urged by the govern-
ment, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and 
human-made inventions.104 Applying this distinction to Chakrabar-
ty, the Court found that Dr. Chakrabarty's micro-organism was 
clearly made through human effort and ingenuity; the fact that it 
was also alive had no relevance for patenting purposes.105 
The majority also rejected the government's argument that Dr. 
Chakrabarty's patent would expand the patent laws into areas 
"wholly unforeseen by Congress"106 and that the Court should, 
therefore, defer to the legislature for a careful weighing of the issues 
involved in patenting genetic products. The Court found that the 
language in section 101 is broad yet wholly unambiguous. 107 It 
reasoned that, once Congress has set the outer limits of patent-
ability, it is the role of the judiciary to give content to the language 
by construing the meaning of the words employed. lOB The Court con-
cluded that to read section 101 as prohibiting patents on any inven-
tion not contemplated by Congress would frustrate the purpose of 
the patent laws since the most socially useful inventions are often 
those completely unforeseen by Congress-those which "push back 
the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like."109 Congress, there-
101. See supra text at notes 45-46. 
102. 447 U.S. at 312-13. The Court said that the Secretary's comments were solicited on the 
administration of the new law, not on the overall scope of the patent laws. 
103. s. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 7 (1930). See discussion of the legislative history of the Act in 447 U.S. at 313-14. 
104. 447 U.S. at 313 (citing S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 
1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930)), 
105. 447 U.S. at 313. The Court also agreed with Chakrabarty that the exclusion of bacteria 
in the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, see supra notes 43,52 and accompanying text, either 
reflected the congressional consensus that bacteria were not considered plants under the 1930 
Act or the fact that the Patent Office was already issuing patents on bacteria. The Court could 
find no support for the argument that the statute was enacted to change the plain meaning of 
the words of § 101, that manufactures are patentable subject matter. 447 U.S. at 314. 
106. 447 U.S. at 314-16. The Court was referring to language in Parker II. Flook. See supra 
note 34. 
107. 447 U.S. at 315. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 315 (quoting J. Douglas concurring in A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 
U.S. 147, 154 (1950)). 
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fore, employed broad language in section 101 to enable the Patent 
Office to grant patents on these kinds of unforeseeable inventions.110 
Finally, the Court refused to consider the effects of the decision on 
genetic research stating that "the grant or denial of patents on 
micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to 
its attendant risks."111 The Court did recognize that the legislature 
is best equipped to weigh the complex issues associated with patent-
ing genetic manufactures. It noted that Congress is still free to 
amend section 101 to prohibit the patenting of such inventions112 as 
it did in the field of nuclear research. 113 The Court concluded, 
however, that, in the absence of any explicit prohibition, the scope of 
the Court's inquiry is "a narrow one of determining what Congress 
meant by words it used in the statute."114 
At the very least, the Chakrabarty case illustrates the difficulty in 
determining congressional intent. It appears that any patchwork of 
statements taken from the legislative history or the Patent Commis-
sioner's office could rationally support either proposition--that liv-
ing organisms were or were not intended to be included within the 
scope of section 101 of the Patent Act. 
In its opinion, the Court appears to have misestimated the impor-
tance of the decision on recombinant DNA development. While the 
majority is clearly correct in stating that "the grant or denial of 
patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic 
research or to its attendant risks,"u5 the Court overlooks the fact 
that the decision is likely to have a bearing on the pace at which the 
research is carried out and on the kind of individuals who will be at-
tracted to conduct or invest in the research.u6 These effects, discussed 
below, raise additional questions about the safety of the research and 
its regulations which, if considered by the Court, might have 
110. 447 U.S. at 316. 
111. Id. at 317. 
112. Id. at 318. 
113. Id. The Court was referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1976) which exempted from patent 
protection inventions "useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic 
energy in an atomic weapon." 
114. 447 U.S. at 318. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan (joined by ,J. White, J. 
Powell, and J. Marshall) agreed with the government that the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 
1970 Plant Variety Protection Act demonstrated Congress' recognition that § 101 does not in· 
c1ude living organisms. Brennan's examination of the legislative history led him to conclude 
that the Congress was doing something much more significant than correcting public percep-
tions about the patentability of plants; it was providing a carefully tailored list of animate ob-
jects which may be patented. 447 U.S. at 318-22. 
115. 447 U.S. at 317. 
116. These effects are discussed in text at notes 138-51 infra. 
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caused it to deny Chakrabarty's application and thus foreclose pat-
ent protection for man-made living organisms until Congress pro-
vides a "clearer signal" on the issue. 
E. Relevance of Chakrabarty to Recombinant DNA Research 
Although Dr. Chakrabarty's Pseudonomas bacteria were not pro-
duced through recombinant DNA techniques,U7 the Court's holding 
is broad enough to afford patentability for recombinant DNA micro-
organisms as well. The Court held that the crucial distinction for pat-
ent protection under section 101 is not whether the invention is alive, 
but whether it was made through human effort and ingenuity as op-
posed to "nature's handiwork." us Recombinant DNA micro-
organisms satisfy this test since they are produced through human 
effort and ingenuity. The process of recombining genetic informa-
tion from two cells to make a new organism would not take place in 
nature but for the ingenuity and labor of laboratory scientists.U9 
Recombinant DNA micro-organisms also satisfy the American Fruit 
Growers "new forms, qualities, and properties"120 test relied on by 
the Court in determining whether an invention is a manufacture 
within the meaning of section 101.121 The process of recombinant 
DNA results in organisms never before known to nature.122 
There is no question that both parties in Chakrabarty realized the 
potential impact of the case on recombinant DNA and other genetic 
research. The government argued that a finding in favor of 
Chakrabarty would compound the ethical and safety issues related to 
all genetic research by permitting individuals to own life forms.123 
The government was supported by an amicus curiae brief from the 
People's Business Commission. After detailing the environmental 
hazards of recombinant DNA research, the Commission concluded: 
"the technology of genetic engineering as a whole, is not in the 
public interest and should not be unduly encouraged by giving un-
warranted economic incentive to corporations in the field of genetic 
research and development through the vehicle of awarding potential-
ly lucrative patents on living organisms."124 
117. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
118. 447 U.S. at 310. 
119. See supra note 2. 
120. See supra notes 60-61, 75-76 and accompanying text. 
121. 447 U.S. at 310. 
122. See supra note 2. 
123. Brief for Petitioner at 20. 
124. Amicus Curiae Brief for People's Business Commission at 5. 
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Chakrabarty, while arguing that "[w]hether patents are to be 
granted on the recombinant DNA technique or its products is quite a 
different issue from whether Chakrabarty's different invention is 
patentable,"126 did concede that "a holding here that living bacteria 
cannot be patented would seriously impact upon recombinant DNA 
research."126 The potential impact of the case on recombinant DNA 
prompted Genentech, Inc., one of the nation's leading private recom-
binant DNA companies,127 to file an amicus brief in support of 
Chakrabarty. The brief attempted to minimize the dangers 
associated with recombinant DNA. As evidence of the diminishing 
hazards, it noted that the recombinant DNA guidelines promulgated 
by the National Institutes of Health128 have been "significantly 
relaxed." 129 
It is clear that, following Chakrabarty, recombinant DNA re-
searchers can expect to receive patent protection for their inven-
tions and processes, and, potentially, the financial benefits which can 
flow from that protection.130 At present, at least two applications 
have been filed in the Patent Office for patents on basic processes in-
volved in recombinant DNA.131 Several more applications have been 
filed for patents on bacteria produced through recombinant DNA 
techniques.132 As a result of the Court's decision, the Patent Office is 
expected to approve these applications.133 
Some commentators134 have observed that the most significant 
benefits from the Chakrabarty case may be experienced in the com-
ing decade when scientists have sufficiently refined the technology 
to produce an organism worth patenting. At present, many private 
researchers may decide to forego patent applications and protect 
their proprietary secrets.135 At the very least, however, the case pro-
vides a psychological boost to the private genetic engineering in-
125. Brief for Respondent at 27. 
126. Id. 
127. See infra note 151 (describing Genentech's involvement on Wall Street). 
128. See infra section IV of this article describing the guidelines in detail. 
129. Amicus Curiae Brief for Genentech, Inc. at 11. 
130. This statement assumes that Congress will not amend the Patent Ad to exclude 
recombinant DNA organisms from patent protection. 
131. Schmeck, U.S. to Process 100 Applications for Patents on Living Organisms, N.Y. 
Times, June 18, 1980, at A 22, col. 1. 
132. Id. These bacteria are useful in producing products such as human insulin, human 
growth hormones, and interferon. 
133. Id. 
134. Parisi, supra note 6 (quoting Nelson Schneider, vice-president of E.F. Hutton & Com-
pany). Wade, Court Says Lab-Made Life Can Be Patented, 208 SCIENCE 1445 (1980). 
135. Wade, supra note 134. 
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dustry. Researchers now realize that, when their discoveries are suf-
ficiently sophisticated to be used regularly in manufacturing prod-
ucts, their work can be protected with a government patent.l36 
III. THE CHANGING GENETIC ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
The Chakrabarty decision has come at a time when a major shift in 
the field of recombinant DNA research from public to private con-
cerns is taking place. l37 When initial reports of recombinant DNA 
technology were made available to the scientific community and the 
public in the mid-1970's, the government, under the auspices of the 
National Institutes of Health, began to provide financial support for 
much of the experimentation taking place in the United States. l3S As 
the wide-ranging practical applications of recombinant DNA 
research have become apparent in recent years, more private firms 
are engaging in the research without government support.l39 The 
potential for creating useful products and earning substantial profits 
has transformed genetic research from a purely academic field into a 
highly competitive, rapidly growing industry.l4o The growth of one 
recombinant DNA firm prompted one of its vice-presidents to 
remark, "[w]e're building another I.B.M. here."l4l Nicholas Wade, 
editor of Science magazine, described the composition of the private 
genetic engineering industry: 
Spearheading the gene-splicing industry are four small com-
panies backed by venture capital and with leading molecular 
biologists among their founders and advisors. Next in the field 
were the large pharmaceutical companies [such as Upjohn, Miles 
Laboratories and Eli Lilly]. The latest arrivals on the scene are 
the giants of the oil and chemical industries, such as DuPont and 
Standard Oil of Indiana which are either recruiting in-house 
teams or establishing links with the small companies.142 
One of the indicators of the growth potential for the private 
genetic engineering industry is its attractiveness to private and cor-
porate investors and investment brokers. Wall Street analysts have 
136. Parisi, supra note 6; Wade, supra note 134. 
137. See generally, Parisi, supra note 6; Wade, supra note 6; Amicus Curiae Brief for Peo-
ple's Business Commission; Powledge, Who Oums Life, NATION, Oct. 1979, at 326. 
138. By the beginning of 1980, the NIH had funded 717 research projects at a cost of ap-
proximately $91.5 million. Amicus Curiae Brief for Genentech, Inc., at 11. 
139. Parisi, supra at note 6. 
140. [d. 
141. Powledge, supra note 137, at 326. 
142. Wade, supra note 6. 
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predicted that genetic engineering will eventually grow into a multi-
billion dollar industry,143 describing the industry as a "major new 
profit opportunity" 144 with the "most exciting investment 
potential." 146 
E.F. Hutton thought that the potential for recombinant DNA was 
so lucrative that it devoted an entire issue of its monthly magazine to 
the genetic engineering industry .146 The magazine contained a 
status report on recombinant DNA development in the fields of 
chemistry, energy, medicine, agriculture, and mining. To illustrate 
the growth potential for the chemical industry, the magazine provid-
ed a market analysis by Genex Corporation, a company which 
recently began a joint venture with Bristol Myers to produce in-
terferon.147 Genex estimated that recombinant DNA technology can 
improve the synthesis of organic chemicals in products which 
resulted in a sales volume of $32.4 billion in the United States in 
1977.148 These estimates are necessarily conservative as they are 
based on current technology assessments and do not take into ac-
count the likelihood that future advances in DNA technology will im-
prove the manufacturing processes on a wider range of products. 149 
As Dr. J. Leslie Glick, President of Genex states: "[t]he possibilities 
are so vast that it is impossible to predict the ultimate scope of the 
impact of recombinant DNA technology. Suffice it to say that I 
believe we have observed merely the tip of the iceberg."16o 
Recombinant DNA technology has generated genuine excitement 
in the investment world.151 Private venture capitalists are not the 
143. Hot Reception Seen Today for Genentech As First Gene-Splicing Firm to Go Public, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1980, at 14. 
144. Amicus Curiae Brief for People's Business Commission at 17 (citing the comments of 
Nelson Schneider, a vice-president of E.F. Hutton). 
145. Id. 
146_ E.F. Hutton Co., BIOTECHNOLOGY, Nov. 1979, at 1 [hereinafter cited as 
BIOTECHNOLOGY]. 
147. Parisi, supra note 6. 
148_ BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 146. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. This excitement is perhaps best illustrated by the experience involving Genentech, 
Inc_, a small San Francisco-based genetic engineering firm which began operations in 1976. In 
Sept., 1980, much to the .delight of Wall Street investors, Genentech decided to become the 
fIrst venture capital DNA fIrm to offer its stock to the public. The public response to 
Genentech's offering on Oct. 10, 1980, created what has been called by the Wall Street Journal 
as "an historic day in the securities markets." The stock opened at $35 per share and rose to 
$86 within 90 minutes_ The price peaked at $88 before closing at $711f4. The opening day in-
crease represented the largest single daily increase for a new issue in 20 years. By the end of 
the day, the market value of the company's shares had risen to approximately $530 million. See 
Hot Reception Seen Today for Genentech As First Gene-Splicing Firm to Go Public, Wall 
1982] RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH 55 
only ones who have been interested in this investment. In October, 
1980, Harvard University announced that it was planning to become 
a minority shareholder in a private genetic engineering firm to raise 
revenues for the school. 152 Ultimately, Harvard chose not to partici-
pate in the firm, deciding that such participation could conflict with 
its traditional academic role. 153 
In summation, the shift of recombinant DNA research from the 
public to the private sector is evident. This trend is likely to continue 
in light of the attractiveness of investment and the potential for prof-
its, a potential more likely to be realized as researchers are granted 
patent protection for their discoveries. It is with this transformation 
of the recombinant DNA industry in mind that the regulations con-
trolling this research must be analyzed. 
IV. THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH'S GUIDELINES 
A. Background 
The federal government focused on the hazards presented by 
recombinant DNA in 1974. On October 7, 1974, the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH), an agency within the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, formed a Recombinant DNA Pro-
gram Advisory Committee to study the hazards of this research and 
to draft guidelines to be followed by recombinant DNA 
researchers. 154 The guidelines were approved by the Director of NIH 
on July 7, 1976.155 They were made applicable to all recombinant 
DNA researchers engaged in NIH-supported work.l56 
St. J., Oct. 14, 1980, at 8; Metz, New Genentech Issues Trades Wildly, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 
1980; Rosenberg, Genentech's Jump a 20-Year Record, Boston Globe, Oct. 15, 1980, at 34, col. 
4. 
152. Commenting on the plan, Harvard President Derek Bok said: "If we are to continue to 
meet rising expenses and to maintain scientific research of high quality, we need to explore 
ways of sharing in the financial rewards that can come from the application of the new 
knowledge discovered in the university." Cooke, Harvard to Decide Soon on DNA Business 
Venture, Boston Globe, Oct. 28, 1980, at 1, 18, col. 6. 
153. Knight, Harvard Rules Out Role for Now in Genetic Engineering Industry, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 6. 
154. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902-03 (1976). This citation is for the "Guidelines for Research Involv-
ing Recombinant DNA Molecules." They begin with an overview of the guidelines written by 
NIH Director Donald S. Fredrickson. His comments are followed by the formal provisions of 
the guidelines which begin at 27,911. As these are guidelines as opposed to regulations, there 
is no corresponding citation in the Code of Federal Regulations. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 27,911. The NIH is primarily responsible for conducting and awarding grants for 
research into man's physical and mental diseases. The NIH administers research agencies for 
specific medical problems such as the National Cancer Institute. The various statutory provi-
sions dealing with the function and management of the NIH do not confer authority to prom-
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The purpose of the 1976 guidelines was to foster development of 
the technology and, at the same time, to advocate considerable cau-
tion and require adequate safeguards from the hazards of the 
research.157 Pursuant to this goal, the guidelines established a 
system for identifying all types of recombinant DNA experiments on 
the basis of risk. Six classifications of high-risk experiments were 
prohibited outright.15s The remaining types of experiments were 
grouped into classes and assigned corresponding levels of contain-
ment to prevent the possible escape of recombinant molecules into 
the environment.159 
The containment procedures which have been retained in the 
subsequent revisions of the guidelines160 provide a dual security 
system-both physical and biological. Physical containment requires 
special laboratory procedures and equipment that create physical 
barriers to an escaping organism. The containment levels are 
classified from PI Oowest level of physical containment) to P4.161 
Biological containment requires the use of experimental organisms 
which are biologically incapable of surviving outside the laboratory 
environment. This is accomplished by using weakened strains of 
host-vector systems-the organisms into which the DNA recombina-
tion is placed.162 The biological containment levels are classified from 
EKI Oowest level of biological containment) to EK3.163 
ulgate binding regulations on the private sector. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203, 206, 281, 290 
(1976). Therefore, the NIH can only regulate research which is conducted by their staff or 
NIH-grantees. 
157. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,911 (1976). 
158. "[E]stimates of the possible dangers that may ensue if that containment fails 
are of such magnitude that we consider it the wisest policy to at least defer ex-
periments on these recombinant DNA's until there is more information to ac-
curately assess that danger and to allow the construction of more effective 
biological barriers." 
Id. at 27,914. The prohibited experiments are described at 27,914-15. 
159. Id. at 27,917-20. 
160. See infra text at notes 170-77. 
161. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,912-14 (1976). See Wade, Recombinant DNA: NIH Group Stirs 
Storm by Drafting Laxer Rules. 190 SCIENCE 767-69 (1975) [hereinafter cited 
as Laxer Rules]. This article describes the physical containment procedures involved at each 
level in layman's terms. The higher level procedures generally involve special engineering 
design features such as air locks and double doors. 
162. See Laxer Rules, supra note 161, for a description of host vector system. The vast ma-
jority of DNA recombinations use the E coli K-12 strain as a host organism. This strain is a 
form of the escherichia coli bacteria which exists in the human intestine. The guidelines re-
quire E coli K-12 strains in increasingly weakened conditions as the potential hazard ofthe ex-
periment escalates. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,915-17 (1976). 
163. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,915-17 (1976). See Laxer Rules, supra note 161, for a discus-
sion of biological containment procedures in layman's terms. 
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Another important feature of the guidelines is the establishment of 
an institutional biohazards committee within each institution which 
receives NIH funds. 164 This committee is responsible for advising the 
institution on recombinant DNA policies and monitoring all recombi-
nant DNA activities within the institution. Specific responsibilities 
include: certifying to the NIH on all grant applications and annually 
thereafter that all DNA research and personnel have been approved 
by the committee; maintaining a central reference file with informa-
tion on recombinant DNA technology and safety; developing a safety 
manual for any P4 laboratory; and making the minutes of its 
meetings available for public inspection.166 
The NIH staff is required to review all proposals for grants in 
order to assure compliance with the NIH guidelines. In reviewing 
the proposals for grants, the NIH assesses the judgment of the in-
stitution's "principal investigator"166 regarding the appropriate 
levels of containment and other safety precautions.167 The NIH will 
refuse to fund any proposals which do not comply with the 
guidelines.168 Mter the awarding of the grant, the NIH continues to 
fulfill its monitoring function by maintaining contact with the in-
stitutional biohazards committees through receipt of their annual 
reports and by responding to questions or problems submitted to 
them by the committees.169 
When the guidelines were promulgated, the NIH Director realized 
that they were based on insufficient data regarding the hazards of 
the research: "At present, the hazards may be guessed at, 
speculated about, or voted upon, but they cannot be known absolute-
ly in the absence of firm experimental data-and unfortunately, the 
needed data were, more often than not, unavailable."170 As a result, 
the guidelines provided for a periodic revision so that current find-
ings regarding the safety of the work could be incorporated into the 
regulatory framework. 171 
Pursuant to the review provisions, the NIH revised the guidelines 
in December, 1978, based on an assessment by the scientific com-
164. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,920 (1976). 
165. Id. 
166. The principle investigator is the individual who applies to the NIH for research fund-
ing. 
167. Id. at 27,921. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. "NIH Staff has responsibility for: (i) Assuring that no NIH grants or contracts are 
awarded ... unless they (a) conform to these guidelines." 
170. Id. at 27,911. 
171. Id. at 27,912. 
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munity that most of the hazards connected to the research were 
becoming more remote.172 This revision exempted five categories of 
experiments from the guidelines-amounting to approximately one-
third of the experiments covered under the 1976 guidelines.173 The 
six classifications of prohibited experiments were continued with the 
Director retaining the authority to grant case-by-case exceptions to 
the prohibitions.174 The physical and biological containment levels 
were retained. Each classification of experiments, however, was 
downgraded at least one step in physical and/or biological contain-
ment.175 The guidelines were relaxed again in 1980.176 These revi-
sions contained additional containment downgrading for certain 
types of experiments and exempted others completely from 
regulatory contro1.177 
B. Analysis of the Guidelines 
The NIH guidelines represent virtually the only direct regulatory 
control over recombinant DNA in this country.178 There is evidence 
that no new regulations will be passed at the federal level. 179 Many 
observers feel that the guidelines-as the sole regulatory control 
over recombinant DNA research-do not provide communities with 
sufficient protection from the hazards of the research.180 The insuffi-
ciencies pointed out by these critics relate to the scope of the 
guidelines, the nature of the promulgating agency, the substance of 
the provisions, and the lack of public involvement in the formation 
and implementation of the guidelines. 




176. 45 Fed. Reg. 6,724 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 25,366 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 77,372 (1980). 
177. Id. 
178. At the present time, there are two state statutes and two local ordinances which also 
regulate the research. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43 §§ 898-910 (1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 
3220 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); BERKELEY, CAL. ORDINANCE 5010, N.5 (1977); CAMBRIDGE, 
MASS. GENERAL ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2 (1977). The Cambridge ordinance is discussed in 
detail in text at section V infra. Other localities which have recently enacted ordinances in-
clude Amherst, Waltham, and Boston, Mass. 
179. In 1977 and 1978 Congress held hearings and drafted bills regulating recombinant 
DNA work. However, none reached the floor of either house for a vote. H.R. 11192, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 7897, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. \1977); S. 1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1978). No bills were considered in 1979 or 1980 and it is unlikely that the Reagan Administra-
tion will permit further regulations given the President's traditional aversion to regulating 
private industry. See Mayer & Kasindorf, Reagan on the Key Issues, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 
1980, at 26-27. 
180. See generally Berger, supra note 1; English, DNA and the Congressional Prerogatives: 
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1. The Scope of the Guidelines 
Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the NIH regulatory scheme 
is the fact that the guidelines are binding only on institutions receiv-
ing NIH funds.18l This leaves the burgeoning private DNA research 
industry182 wholly outside the regulatory framework. As a result, the 
guidelines control only a small fraction of the recombinant DNA ac-
tivities taking place in this country.183 Clearly, as the shift toward 
private genetic research continues-a shift undoubtedly accelerated 
by the Chakrabarty decision which allows patenting of genetic 
organisms184-the fraction of projects under the control of the NIH 
will decrease. 
When the NIH originally proposed its guidelines and solicited com-
ments from the public, many commentators felt that the public could 
only be protected if regulatory control was asserted over the private 
sector.186 The NIH held meetings with representatives of twenty 
drug and chemical manufacturers in May, 1976 to discuss regulation 
of the private sector.186 The representatives did voice their general 
support for the guidelines and for voluntary compliance but ex-
pressed the fear that these guidelines might lead to enforceable 
regulations.187 They argued that mandatory control over their work 
would force them to reveal proprietary secrets which would jeopard-
ize their competitive edge and that restrictions on large volume 
experiments would make their production processes less commer-
cially feasible.188 
The NIH's response to the private sector was to initiate a volun-
tary program for private companies wishing to register their ex-
periments with the NIH.189 The obvious weakness in this program is 
Proposalsjor a Deliberate Legislative Approach to Genetic Research, 53 IND. L.J. 571 (1978); 
HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HOUSE REPORT ON H.R. 11192, H.R. REP. No. 
1005, pt. 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as DNA REPORT]; King, New Genetic 
Technologies: Prospects and Hazards, TECH. REV., Feb. 1980, at 57, 60. 
181. This was a major criticism contained in the DNA REPORT at 7. It should be pointed out 
that this criticism is directed at the guidelines as a regulatory system and not at the NIH for 
failing to provide for private regulation. It would appear that since Congress did not pass 
enabling legislation permitting the NIH to regulate the private sector, the NIH is without 
authority to bind private recombinant DNA research. See supra note 156. 
182. The growth of the private DNA industry is documented at section III supra. 
183. DNA REPORT, supra note 180, at 7. 
184. See supra text at notes 117-36. 
185. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,905 (1976). 
186. [d. at 27,906. 
187. Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, CURRENT, Nov. 1976, at 25.29. 
188. [d. 
189. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,906 (1976). 
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the lack of power to enforce the guidelines. Since private companies 
which voluntarily submit receive no financial support from the NIH, 
the NIH cannot rely upon its sole enforcement mechanism-with-
drawal of its funds. 
Congress has recognized that exemption of the private sector 
represents a serious inadequacy in the regulation of recombinant 
DNA. In a report190 on the proposed Recombinant DNA Act,191 the 
House Committee on Science and Technology identified this 
weakness in the NIH guidelines and endorsed regulation of the 
private sector. 
The question then can be asked, is it sensible or fair to require 
compliance with a set of standards by some researchers in this 
area and not by all? It is the considered belief of most who have 
studied the matter that all should proceed under the same rules 
or the 'guidelines' will be little more than a charade.192 
The proposed Act provided for extension of the guidelines to the 
private sector and empowered the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services to enforce the guidelines through fines 
and withdrawal of NIH funds. 193 The scientific community felt ex-
tremely threatened by such a legislative plan to regulate private 
research.t94 Not surprisingly, the scientific lobby was instrumental 
in defeating the proposed Recombinant DNA Act.195 
2. The Nature of the NIH 
Another criticism directed at the guidelines concerns the nature of 
the NIH as the rule-making agency. 196 The NIH is attempting to play 
a dual role in recombinant DNA research: it acts as promoter of the 
research by awarding millions of dollars in research grants; and, at 
the same time, as policeman by promulgating guidelines to 
safeguard the public from the research it sponsors.197 The potential 
for conflict between these seemingly contradictory roles is 
obvious. 198 
190. DNA REPORT, supra note 180. 
191. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
192. DNA REPORT, supra note 180. 
193. [d. at 2-3. 
194. King, supra note 180, at 60. 
195. [d. 
196. See generally English, supra note 180, at 574; Hubbard, Gazing into the Crystal Ball, 
26 BIOSCIENCE 608 (1976); Berger, supra note 1, at 91-93. 
197. Berger, supra note 1, at 92. 
198. An analogous situation in which a government agency was performing conflicting roles 
existed in the field of atomic energy when the Atomic Energy Commission had the dual 
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The potential for conflict of interest is magnified by the fact that 
the NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee which drafted 
the guidelines is comprised of DNA researchers.199 Thus, the job of 
regulating DNA researchers has largely been left to the researchers 
themselves. One author described the situation as follows: 
[T]he NIH Guidelines, despite the fact that they were issued by 
an agency of government, were rules that were devised by scien-
tists for scientists. As long as government regulation of scien-
tific research was under the auspices of the NIH, the research 
community felt secure. It was, in effect, a form of self-
regulation.20o 
Having promulgated guidelines which amount to a form of "self-
regulation,"201 the NIH inspires little public confidence that it is 
capable of policing recombinant DNA work effectively. The NIH 
does not have the arm's length relationship with the scientific com-
munity202 necessary to monitor this research. As a result, it would 
appear desirable to remove the policing responsibilities from the 
NIH and establish a separate monitoring unit elsewhere within the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, or within the NIH, provid-
ed it is staffed by laymen. Such a unit would have the responsibility 
for coapproving NIH grants, conducting site inspections in the field, 
and maintaining liaison with the institutional biohazards committees. 
3. The Substantive Provisions 
In light of the conflict of interest inherent in the NIH's responsibil-
ities and the comfortable relationship the agency enjoys with the 
research community,203 the substantive provisions of the guidelines 
must be examined closely as well. The 1978 and 1980 revisions repre-
sent-to use former Secretary Califano's words-"a substantial 
relaxation" of the guidelines.204 Although the Secretary concluded 
that the 1978 revisions were based on new information regarding the 
safety of recombinant DNA technology, questions have been raised 
concerning the accuracy of the "new information" provided to the 
responsibilities split between two separate agencies-the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
the Energy Research and Development Administration. This division was accomplished in the 
Engergy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (8ee 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5814 (1976)). 
199. Berger, supra note 1, at 90. 
200. [d. at 9l. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. 
203. See supra text at notes 197-202. 
204. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,081 (1978). 
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NIH.205 Certainly the temptation for scientists to color their assess-
ment of the technology is substantial considering the prestige206 and 
profits207 at stake. 
According to Massachusetts Institute of Technology geneticist Dr. 
Jonathan King, the relaxation of the guidelines is directly related to 
misrepresentations about the safety of genetic technology by a 
group of scientists working for commercial interests.208 He conclud-
ed that, as a result of their efforts, "the guidelines have now been so 
weakened that, rather than protecting public health, they in fact pro-
tect those engaged in the technology from public inquiry and regula-
tion. "209 If this assessment of the substantive provisions of the 
guidelines is at all accurate, it is clear that the NIH has failed in its 
difficult, if not impossible, role of striking a balance between pro-
moting this exciting technology and promulgating substantive con-
trols to safeguard society from its potential hazards. 
Another more specific deficiency in the substance of the guidelines 
is the monitoring system which it establishes. The guidelines only re-
quire on-site inspections of P4 facilities, of which there are only a 
handful in the entire country. 210 After the initial review of a grant 
proposal by the NIH staff, in practice, the bulk of the responsibility 
for assuring compliance with the guidelines shifts to the project's 
principal investigator and his institution's biosafety committee.211 
These individuals with vested interests in seeing their projects com-
pleted can hardly be characterized as neutral monitors. Under the 
present monitoring framework, it is possible for the local institution-
al biohazards committees to go a complete year without having any 
contact with the NIH office in Washington.212 
There is also evidence that in the present monitoring framework 
205. King, supra note 180, at 60. 
206. As with other new sciences, DNA research offers international recognition to its 
leaders. Dr. Walter Gilbert of Harvard was recently awarded the Nobel Prize for his work in 
recombinant DNA technology. See Five New Nobel Laureates, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1980, at 
117. 
207. See supra section III regarding the profitability of the private genetic engineering in-
dustry. 
208. King, supra note 180, at 60. 
209. Id. 
210. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,921 (1976). 
211. "The principle functions of the !BC (Institutional Biosafety Committee) are to review 
and oversee all recombinant DNA projects with respect to compliance with the Guidelines and 
to advise the institution ... whether the proposals and the research so comply." 43 Fed. 
Reg. 60,080, 60,093 (1980). 
212. The guideline roles and responsibilities section mentions that the !BC must certify that 
research activities are in compliance with the guidelines in an annual report. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 
902,27,920 (1978). 
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the guidelines are not taken seriously or are ignored completely.213 
One science journalist who spent three months working in a Califor-
nia genetic engineering lab observed: 
The high containment (P3) lab upstairs was shut down by the 
university's biohazard committee for a few days this week. I was 
dismayed to hear people joking about the closure and the messy 
conditions that precipitated it. Among the young graduate 
students and post doctorates it seemed almost chic not to know 
the NIH rules.214 
It appears that tighter monitoring procedures would enhance the 
NIH's capacity to police recombinant DNA work and in the process 
provide better protection to society. These ends could be accom-
plished by requiring the NIH to remain in closer, more frequent con-
tact with the local institutions after the grant has been awarded and 
by requiring NIH staff to conduct site inspections on all recombinant 
DNA labs (PI through P4). These improvements, of course, would 
require increased funding and staffing of the NIH, measures unlike-
ly to occur given the commitment of the Reagan Administration to 
reduce government spending. 
4. The Role of the Public 
A final deficiency in the NIH guidelines is that the public has 
played little role in their formulation and administration. The guide-
lines were originally based on the discussions conducted at a con-
ference of microbiologists in Aslomar, California in 1975.215 The 
original drafting body, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, 
was comprised entirely of scientists.216 The extensive 1978 revision 
of the guidelines was drafted by a Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee which had two laymen among its sixteen members.217 On the 
local level the lack of public involvement is evidenced by the fact that 
the 1976 guidelines did not require any laymen unconnected to the 
institution as members of the local institutional biohazards commit-
tees.218 
Clearly, in regulating this research, which is complex and con-
stantly changing, government must rely substantially on input from 
213. Hopson, Recombinant Lab for DNA and My 95 Days in it, SMITHSONIAN, May/June 
1977, at 61. 
214. [d. 
215. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). 
216. See King, supra note 180, at 56. 
217. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,097 (1978). 
218. The Secretary did identify this problem and the 1978 guidelines require 20 percent of 
the !Be members to be laymen with no ties to the institution. [d. at 60,081. 
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the scientists to define the risks involved. It does not follow, 
however, that the public should be foreclosed completely from the 
regulating process, or play an insignificant role. As Harold P. Green 
has pointed out, it is inappropriate and antithetical to the democratic 
process to rely solely upon scientists to assess the cost and benefits 
of public safety issues and permit them to make decisions based on 
those assessments.219 According to Green, constructing a cost/ 
benefit analysis on public safety issues always involves making value 
jUdgments. Since risks and benefits mean different things to dif-
ferent people,220 scientists are simply incapable of accurately reflect-
ing those judgments in their cost/benefit analyses:221 "No elite group 
of experts, no matter how broadly constituted, has the ability to 
make an objective and valid determination with respect to what 
benefits people want and what risks people are willing to assume in 
order to have these benefits."222 Of course, in determining accept-
able levels of risk, the scientific community must be called upon to 
identify and quantify the scientific risks and benefits of the issue.223 
It is, however, the lay community which, by virtue of its ability to in-
corporate a broad spectrum of value judgments into its cost/benefit 
analyses, is most appropriate to make the ultimate decision regard-
ing what levels of risk society is willing to bear. The resulting deci-
sion, therefore, should reflect a partnership between the scientific 
and lay communities.224 
I t is clear that the NIH has not allowed the public to assume this 
type of role. One possible explanation for this result is the common 
perception within the scientific community that the public is simply 
too ignorant to make intelligent assessments and decisions regard-
ing the hazards of complicated scientific technology such as recom-
binant DNA.225 For adherents of this view, self-regulation by scien-
tists, therefore, becomes a necessity. This view is illustrated by the 
remarks of William McGill, president of Columbia University: 
"Scientific questions simply cannot be settled by persuasive argu-
219. Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
791-807 (1975). 
220. Green uses the example of a nuclear power plant. To some, the benefits of the increased 
energy production outweigh the hazards of the undertaking. To those living in the 
neighborhood of the proposed plant, however, the cost benefit calculation might come out the 
other way. Id. at 792 n.3. 
221. Id. at 792. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Halvorson, DNA and the Law, 51 So. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1977-78). 
225. Berger, supra note 1, at 95. 
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ment. The only effective method for resolving safety questions in 
nuclear or biological research is the objective analysis of experimen-
tal results by our best scientific minds."226 
Despite this attitude, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
laymen are capable of making intelligent decisions on issues with a 
scientific basis after the risks and benefits have been identified by 
experts. For example, legislators at all levels of government com-
monly hear testimony from experts before enacting legislation ad-
dressed to problems of a complex and scientific nature such as air 
and water pollution, nuclear energy, and hazardous waste control,227 
In procuring medical service under the doctrine of "informed con-
sent," a patient has a right to decide what treatment he will receive, 
after his physician has identified the risks and benefits associated 
with each procedure.228 Juries are commonly asked to decide com-
plex issues after the complexities have been explained by experts 
and argued by adversaries.229 
In light of the above examples, it appears that the public could 
move to the forefront in deciding levels of risks regarding recombi-
nant DNA research after the risks have been identified by scientists. 
Such an evaluation of the public role would eliminate the self-regulat-
ing aspect of the guidelines and permit a weighing of risks more 
reflective of the attitudes of the American public in regard to this 
controversial research. 
It does appear that the NIH is at least moving toward the goal of 
fostering public participation. In promulgating the December, 1978 
guidelines, former Secretary Califano recognized the need for more 
public participation in the regulation of genetic research.230 The 
Secretary announced that he would expand the base of the Recombin-
ant DNA Advisory Committee, which is responsible for drafting the 
guidelines, to include representatives from the fields of law, public 
health, ethics, and the environment.231 Furthermore, on the local 
level, the 1978 guidelines require that 20 percent of the Institutional 
Biohazards Committee be comprised of individuals who represent 
the general public with no ties to the institution.232 The guidelines 
226. [d. (quoting an address reprinted in 198 SCIENCE 275 (1977». 
227. Berger, supra note 1, at 97. 
228. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 1974); Annot., 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 
(1978). 
229. Berger, supra note I, at 96·97. 
230. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,081 (1978). 
231. [d. 
232. [d. 
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also require the bulk of the Institutional Biohazards Committee 
records to be made available for public inspection. 233 
These steps clearly afford more public participation and scrutiny 
over recombinant DNA research. At the same time, they appear to 
fall far short of allowing the public to playa significant role in deter-
mining what risks society is willing to tolerate in regard to this 
research. As a result, a few local communities have, on their own in-
itiative, established controls over recombinant DNA research. The 
final portion of this article discusses the action taken by one com-
munity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in regard to recombinant DNA. 
V. THE CAMBRIDGE RECOMBINANT DNA ORDINANCE 
Since the NIH guidelines represent the sole form of direct federal 
regulation over this research, the weaknesses in the guidelines234 
raise serious questions as to whether communities are sufficiently 
protected from the potential hazards of recombinant DNA. States 
and localities may consider enacting further control over this 
developing technology particularly in light of the Chakrabarty case 
which provides additional incentives to the growing genetic 
engineering industry. One community which has responded to the 
hazards of recombinant DNA is Cambridge, Massachusetts, which in 
1977 enacted an ordinance controlling the research.235 
The following discussion considers the Cambridge ordinance as a 
potential model for other communities desiring more control over 
recombinant DNA research. The provisions of the ordinance and 
their application in Cambridge will be analyzed mainly in terms of 
the ways in which they address the major inadequacies in the NIH 
guidelines: the scope of the regulation; the conflict of roles within the 
monitoring agency; and the degree of public participation afforded in 
the regulation process. Weaknesses in the ordinance and sugges-
tions for improvement will be discussed as well. 
A. Background 
Public concern over recombinant DNA research is no more evident 
than in Cambridge, Massachusetts; a city in which a substantial 
amount of recombinant DNA research is carried out at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and Harvard Univer-
233. [d. at 60,080. 
234. See supra text at section IV. 
235. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2 (1981). 
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sity.236 The volatility of the issue was demonstrated in the summer of 
1976 when a public uproar resulted in response to a story in a Boston 
weekly newspaper describing Harvard's plan to build a P3 lab for 
recombinant DNA experiments. 237 Mayor Albert Vellucci responded 
to the community's concern by sponsoring public hearings. These 
hearings, which drew overflow audiences and received considerable 
media attention,23B provided Cambridge residents with an opportuni-
ty to discuss the research.239 Witnesses from Harvard and the NIH 
testified, explaining the benefits and risks associated with recombi-
nant DNA.240 After the hearings, the City Council imposed a three-
week moratorium on all recombinant DNA research and began to 
consider an ordinance to regulate all DNA experimentation in the ci-
ty. The ordinance was passed unanimously on February 7, 1977.241 
B. Analysis oj the Ordinance 
1. Scope of the Ordinance 
One of the crucial differences between the ordinance and the NIH 
guidelines is that the ordinance controls all recombinant DNA exper-
imentation in the City of Cambridge.242 In other words, all institu-
tions and private research labs are legally required to comply with 
the ordinance regardless of whether they are receiving financial sup-
port from the NIH. By asserting control over private research, the 
ordinance has successfully addressed what has been described as the 
most critical inadequacy in the federal regulation of the recombinant 
DNA research.243 
236. Harvard and MIT have active recombinant DNA laboratories. Cambridge has been 
described as one of the birthplaces of recombinant DNA since many of the initial discoveries 
regarding this technology were made at these institutions. Interview with Dr. Robert Neer, 
chairman of the Cambridge Biohazards Committee in Boston, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter cited 
as Neer Interview]. 
237. For a discussion of the events in Cambridge in the summer of 1!J76, see Bennett & 
Gurin, Science That Frightens Scientists, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1977, at 43, 60-61. 
238. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
239. [d. The transcripts of these proceedings are available at the Cambridge City Hall and 
the Cambridge Public Library [hereinafter cited as DNA Transcripts]. 
240. DNA Transcripts, supra note 239. 
241. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-9 (1977). A revision ofthe ordinance 
was passed on Apr. 27, 1981, in response to the possibility of commercial DNA firms locating 
in Cambridge. Most of the provisions in the two versions are similar. The following discussion 
does refer and cite to the revised ordinance and, where appropriate how these provisions im-
prove upon the prior ordinance. . . . 
242. Section 11-7(II) provides: "All use of RlecombinantJ DNA experiments by InstItutIOns 
in the City of Cambridge shall be undertaken only in strict conformity with the 'Guidelines.' " 
243. DNA REPORT, supra note 180, at 7. 
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Prior to 1980, this distinction betwen the NIH guidelines and the 
ordinance was not as crucial since all research in Cambridge was be-
ing conducted at Harvard and M.1. T. 244 These institutions receive 
support from the NIH, and, thus, their experiments are already con-
trolled by the NIH guidelines. In the fall of 1980, however, Biogen, 
Inc.-a private, Swiss genetic engineering firm, considered locating 
a research facility in Cambridge. Aware of the ordinance and its con-
trol over private research, Biogen met with the City Council and the 
Cambridge Biohazards Committee (CBC) to discuss their work and 
any difficulties they might have in complying with the ordinance.245 
Presumably, more private firms will be established to take advan-
tage of the potential in genetic research, and they too will be gov-
erned by the Cambridge ordinance.246 
2. The Substantive Provisions 
The Cambridge ordinance draws upon the work of the NIH by in-
corporating the 1976 guidelines and subsequent revisions.247 In addi-
tion, the ordinance mandates safety precautions beyond those re-
quired by the guidelines. For example, the ordinance requires all in-
stitutions proposing recombinant DNA work to prepare a detailed 
safety manual for research conducted at all levels of containment.248 
The NIH guidelines require the manual only in regard to P4 ex-
periments. 249 The Cambridge ordinance also prohibits experiments 
classified by the NIH as potentially more hazardous than P3-EK2 
containment without prior approval of the CBC and completely pro-
hibits P4 experiments.25o In contrast, the NIH guidelines permit ex-
periments classified up to P4 physical containment and EK3 
biological containment. 251 The ordinance also grants authority to the 
Commissioner of Health and Hospitals to issue additional health 
regulations to achieve the purpose of the ordinance,252 although, to 
date, the Commissioner has not used this authority. 
244. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
245. Id. The Biogen plan is discussed further in the text at notes 306-09 infra. 
246. Some investors and scientists have predicted that Massachusetts will become the 
research center of the world for recombinant DNA research with strong inducements to come 
to the area such as the proximity of Harvard and MIT. Cooke, Genetic Engineers: From Labs 
to Riches, Boston Sunday Globe, Sept. 13, 1981, p. 1, col. 1-4. 
247. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-7(11) (1981). 
248. Id. § 11-7(IV)(a)(4). 
249. 41 Fed. Reg. at 27,902, 27,920 (1976). 
250. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-10 (1981). The Camhridge 
Biohazards Committee is discussed in detail in text at notes 253-98 infra. 
251. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,912-14, 27,917. 
252. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-7(11) (1981). 
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Another significant component of the Cambridge ordinance is the 
provision of a system for enforcing the safety regulations beyond 
that provided by the NIH guidelines. The ordinance provides for the 
formation of the CBC "for the purpose of overseeing all use of 
R[ ecombinant] DNA in the City of Cambridge."253 This committee 
adds an additional tier of policing to the NIH guideline monitoring 
system. In the NIH framework, the principle investigator254 is 
responsible to his institution's biohazards committee which, in turn, 
reports directly to the NIH.255 The CBC provides an intermediate 
level of monitoring between the institutional biohazards committees 
and the NIH, as the institutional biohazards committees must report 
regularly to the CBC as well as to the NIH. The specific responsibili-
ties of the CBC include: maintaining liaison with the institutional bio-
hazards committees256 (at Harvard and M.I.T.); reviewing all pro-
posals for recombinant DNA research;257 conducting site visits to in-
stitutional laboratories;258 and approving all revisions and amend-
ments of the NIH guidelines.259 
One feature recently amended to the ordinance26o is a requirement 
that all institutions proposing to use recombinant DNA must first ob-
tain a permit from the Commissioner of Health and Hospitals with 
the approval of the CBC.261 The permit application must include a 
written statement agreeing to: abide by the approved NIH 
guidelines and other ordinance provisions; allow site and record in-
spections by the CBC; prepare.a health and safety manual; and 
establish a safety training program for research personnel. 262 Addi-
tional permit requirements are mandated for those institutions 
engaging in "large-scale" uses of recombinant DNA.263 For exam-
ple, their permits must contain a statement that researchers will ob-
253. [d. at § 11·7(III). The nature of the CBC is discussed in text at notes 279-92 infra. 
254. See supra note 166. 
255. See supra text at notes 164-69. 
256. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-7(V) (1981). 
257. [d. § 11-9(I)(c). 
258. [d. § 11-9(IXe). 
259. [d. § 11-9(I)(b). The ordinance incorporates the NIH guidelines and its revisions. See 
supra note 242 and accompanying text. The ordinance also provides that, if the guidelines are 
discontinued or abolished by the NIH, "those guidelines in effect at the time of such discontin-
uance shall remain in effect in the City of Cambridge." [d. § 11-9(I)(b). 
260. The amendments were approved by the City Council on Apr. 27, 1981. 
261. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2. § 11-7(IV)(a) (1981). 
262. [d. 
263. "Large-scale" experiments are those defined by the NIH Guidelines as those involving 
cultures over 10 liters. These experiments are regulated by the NIH Guidelines found in 45 
Fed. Reg. 77,384 (1980). These regulations are directed at commercial institutions concerned 
with profitability, whose economies of scale necessitate larger-scale experiments. 
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tain advance approval for uses of recombinant DNA requiring P2 or 
P3 physical containment.264 
To date, there has been no record of the effect of the permit re-
quirements on the monitoring of recombinant DNA researeh. When 
commercial enterprises do begin their operation in Cambridge, the 
permit system should facilitate the CBC's efforts to monitor their ac-
tivity. 
The ordinance also contains stricter sanctions for violation of the 
regulations than those provided by the NIH guidelines. The penalties 
for violating the ordinance are a $200 fine per day and the possibility 
of closure of the facility by the Cambridge Commission of Health and 
Hospitals.265 In addition, the Commissioner may revoke the institu-
tion's operating permit for material violations of the ordinance or 
the permit agreements.266 In contrast, the sanctions available to the 
NIH under the guidelines are limited to withdrawal of NIH funds. 267 
A review of records maintained by the CBC shows that, in prac-
tice, the committee is actively fulfilling monitoring responsibilities 
imposed by the ordinance.268 The bulk of the monitoring function is 
carried out through correspondence between the CBC and the in-
stitutional biohazards committees at Harvard and M.LT. Copies of 
all research proposals at the institutions are forwarded to the CBC 
for review. The institutional biohazards committees also forward all 
minutes of their meetings to the CBC to keep them informed of 
developments at their institution.269 
As required by the ordinance,270 the CBC has met and approved 
the revisions of the NIH guidelines which contain a down scaling of 
containment levels.271 CBC records also reveal that the Committee 
264. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-8(IXe) (1981). 
265. Id. § 11-11(1). 
266. Id. § 11-l1(I)(a) (1981). 
267. 41 Fed. Reg. ~7,902, 27,921 (1976). 
268. These records are available for public inspection in the CBC staff office located at the 
Cambridge City Hospital. 
269. These minutes and proposals are kept on file at the CBC office and are available for 
public inspection. 
270. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-9(IXb) (1981). 
271. The Dec., 1978 guidelines were approved by the Committee on Jan. 24, 1979. See 
Minutes of CBC Meeting of Jan. 24, 1979. The July 29,1980, revisions were approved on Sept. 
18, 1980, see Minutes of CBC Meeting of Sept. 18, 1980. In regard to the July 29, 1980, revi-
sion (proposed in Apr., 1980) a delay in approval by the CBC did have an impact on research at 
Harvard. In a letter sent by CBC Chairman Dr. Robert Neer to the biological safety officers at 
MIT and Harvard, Chairman Neer noted: 
I understand from Dr. Lieberman that two experiments at Harvard have been 
delayed because we had not formally approved the April revisions of the rules for 
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has visited the recombinant DNA laboratory sites at Harvard and 
M.LT. The last visits were made on March 20, 1980, and April 17, 
1980.272 Dr. Robert Neer, chairman of the CBC, contemplates that 
site visits will take place on a once-a-year basis unless there are ex-
igent circumstances indicating that an immediate inspection is re-
quired.273 An additional role which the CBC has assumed is to pro-
vide a public forum for the discussion of particularly controversial 
aspects of recombinant DNA regulation. For example, on October 
28, 1980, the CBC sponsored a public hearing in regard to Biogen's 
plan to construct a research facility in East Cambridge.274 
One indication of the efficacy of the monitoring system is the will-
ingness of the research community to assist the CBC in their policing 
function. They have submitted descriptions of their research and for-
warded copies of the institutional biohazards committees meetings 
to the CBC.275 Furthermore, a letter sent by Dr. Neer to M.LT. and 
Harvard,276 indicating that researchers delayed experiments until 
the guidelines were approved by the CBC, is further evidence that 
the recombinant DNA researchers respect the authority of the CBC 
and are willing to operate within the regulatory framework created 
by the ordinance. Dr. Neer commented that the institutional 
biohazards committees' practice of communicating and assisting the 
CBC in their monitoring function stems mainly from the CBC's 
power to approve or reject NIH guideline revisions: 
They [the institutional biohazards committees] come to see us on 
a regular basis because we have to approve any changes in the 
NIH guidelines, and that brings them continuously back. That 
makes it not only in our interest, but in their interest, that there 
be an open flow of communication going on, because anytime 
that we get dissatisfied with something that they are doing we 
can just refuse to approve the latest revision in the NIH guide-
lines and then they have every investigator [preparing to con-
duct research pursuant to these revisions] in the university ... 
complaining to them. That's a tremendous power embedded in 
the last article of the ordinance.277 
work with genes from viruses. To avoid backlogs in the Committee, I suggest 
that we review each revision of the NIH guidelines as it is published. 
Letter from Dr. Robert Neer to biological safety officers at MIT and Harvard (Aug. 25, 1980). 
272. See Minutes of CBC Meeting of Mar. 20, 1980, and Apr. 17, 1980. 
273. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
274. See supra text at note 245. 
275. See supra-note 269 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra note 271. 
277. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
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3. The Nature of the CBC 
The nature of the Cambridge Biohazards Committee has a signifi-
cant impact on the efficacy of the committee in both positive and 
negative ways. The four members of the CBC278 are representatives 
from the lay community without any ties to facilities undertaking 
recombinant DNA research.279 Although their contact with the two 
institutional biohazards committees has educated them about recom-
binant DNA, they lack expertise or experience in the field of genetic 
research.280 One distinct advantage inherent in this type of monitor-
ing committee is that, unlike the members of the NIH's Recombinant 
DNA Advisory Committee who are mainly DNA researchers,281 the 
CBC members are free from potential conflicts of interest in fulfill-
ing their policing responsibilities. In other words, there is no danger 
that the assessments of individual CBC members will be colored by 
considerations of how their decisions will affect their colleagues 
researching in the field. The potential for unbiased assessments of 
safety hazards, therefore, is at a maximum. 
Another improvement in this monitoring system over the NIH 
framework is that the function of the CBC is solely regulatory. By 
contrast, under the NIH guidelines, the NIH is attempting to fulfill 
the contradictory roles of sponsoring and policing recombinant DNA 
research.282 By concentrating its efforts on monitoring, the CBC 
does not have to consider promotion of the research in its decisions. 
On the negative side, the nature of the CBC does raise questions 
concerning the competence of the committee to monitor the 
research. There is some evidence that the committee is hampered by 
a lack of technical expertise in uncovering the more subtle problems 
raised by the research. For example, while approving the revision of 
the NIH guidelines is one of the committee's most important func-
tions,283 it appears that the CBC has accepted the NIH reassessment 
of the potential hazards of recombinant DNA without much independ-
ent review. 
278. The ordinance provides for five members: three appointed by the City Manager; one to 
represent the Chairperson of the Health Policy Board; and one to represent the Commissioner 
of Public Health. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11-7 (I1I)(a)(1981). As ofthis 
writing, there was no Commissioner of Public Health and no one was designated to represent 
that office. 
279. The occupations of the members are: endocrinologist; chemist; employee of the Cam-
bridge Rent Control Board; and a retired nutritionist. Neer Interview, supra. note 236. 
280. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
281. See supra text at notes 199-200. 
282. See supra text at notes 197-98. 
283. See supra. text at note 277. 
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The initial approval of the July 29, 1980 guidelines was conducted 
through a telephone poll of the committee members.284 Dr. Neer ad-
mits that the committee lacks the expertise to make a comprehensive 
investigation of the NIH downscaling of containment levels: "When 
it comes to the question of whether experiment A is appropriately 
classified under the guidelines, those evaluations involved judgments 
that we are totally incapable of making."285 As a result, the CBC 
"rubber stamps" the technical revisions of the guidelines. Dr. Neer 
does point out that major nontechnical issues contained in the revi-
sions do receive considerable discussion and evaluation.286 It would 
appear that placement of a geneticist on the committee would pro-
vide the committee with enough technical expertise to comprehend 
the technical aspects of the guidelines without risking the threat of 
self-regulation as exemplified by the NIH guidelines. 
Another illustration of the need for more technical expertise 
within the committee or more consultation with experts relates to 
the site monitoring conducted at Harvard and M.LT. in March and 
April of 1980.287 The committee records describe these events as 
"tours" and "visits" in which the CBC was given an opportunity to 
see the facilities and ask questions. 288 These descriptions hardly sug-
gest the meticulous inspection seemingly contemplated by the or-
dinance.289 On the other hand, Dr. Neer has stated that the site visits 
were far from cosmetic, as certain practices were readily apparent to 
the committee, such as whether the facilities were clean and free of 
insects, and whether the biological waste was stored in special con-
tainers.29o Commenting on the value of these visits, Dr. Neer con-
cluded: "You can't tell whether they [the guidelines] are being 
observed successfully . . . to the letter . . . but you can get a very 
284. See Minutes of CBC Meeting of July 17, 1980. 
285. Neer Interview, supra note 236. 
286. To illustrate the levei of scrutiny for nontechnical revisions, Dr. Neer noted that cer-
tain classes of PI experiments were exempted by the 1978 guidelines; therefore, the possibili-
ty existed that investigators involved in those exempted experiments could proceed without 
approval from their institution's biohazards committee. The Committee noted this possibility 
and ordered the IBC to continue to approve all PI experiments. This was done to guarantee 
that someone other than the investigator would he reviewing PI experiments. Neer Interview, 
supra. note 236. 
287. See supra text at note 272. 
288. See Minutes of CBC Meeting of Mar. 20, 1980, and Apr. 17, 1980. 
289. Although § 11-8(1VXa)(3) authorizes the CBC to carry out site visits to institutional 
facilities, it is hard to imagine how anything less than a careful inspection of laboratories would 
further the purpose of the ordinance. CAMBRlDCE, MASS. OIWINAN(:F;S ch. 11, art. 2, § 
11-8(IVXaX3) (1981). 
290. Neer Interview, supr!L at 230. 
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good sense of whether people are serious or not, and, I think they are 
seriously followed." 291 
Whether this level of scrutiny is desirable for site visits, of course, 
depends on the perception of the individual community. The mere 
presence of a government committee walking through a recombi-
nant DNA lab is bound to have some effect on the conduct of re-
searchers.292 
The City Council apparently was concerned by the lack of technical 
expertise available to the CBC in fulfilling its responsibilities. Under 
the 1981 revised ordinance, the CBC has the express authority to 
hire "competent professional assistance in carrying out their 
duties."293 In the case of site inspections on "large-scale" institu-
tions,294 the institution must reimburse the city for the expense in-
volved. 295 Whether the CBC will use this power effectively in calling 
on experts whenever important technical matters arise remains to be 
seen. 
The negative aspects of the lay composition of the CBC, however, 
could be addressed more directly by placing one expert on the com-
mittee. Placement of one geneticist on the CBC would increase the 
overall efficacy of the committee, since the expert could explain the 
technical aspects of the research to his fellow committeemen. The 
need to call in outside experts would be obviated in most situations. 
These explanations would aid the committee in their evaluations of 
the revised NIH guidelines, which are currently "rubber 
stamped,"296 and help in conducting site visitations which, to date, 
are mainly cosmetic.297 Since the geneticist would represent a 
distinct minority on the committee (one out of five), there would be 
little chance of his dominating the committee and turning the or-
dinance into a form of self-regulation. In seeking such an expert, the 
committee would be advised to find an individual with no special bias 
or financial interest in recombinant DNA research so that the infor-
mation they receive from the geneticist is as objective as possible.298 
291. [d. 
292. [d. 
293. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11·7(IIIXC) (1981). 
294. See supra note 263. 
295. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 2, § 11·8(IXCX3) (1981). 
296. See supra text at note 286. 
297. See supra text at notes 287-92. 
298. Admittedly, finding such an individual would be difficult, particularly in a university 
town where most scientists would be working for the university and interested in contributing 
to this technological advancement. 
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4. The Role of the Public 
In the House report on the Recombinant DNA Act,299 the Inter-
state Commerce Committee recognized the authority of localities to 
respond to public safety issues, such as those raised by recombinant 
DNA research. The Committee noted: "[I]t is an important Constitu-
tional prerogative for State and local governments to be able to deal 
legally with issues which are primarily local in nature."300 Living in 
one of the nation's centers for recombinant DNA research, the 
residents of Cambridge have acted pursuant to their constitutional 
prerogatives and mobilized to control what they have perceived as a 
threat to public safety. In both the formulation and implementation 
of the Cambridge ordinance, the public has played an active role. 
In the formulation process, the ordinance resulted from well-
attended public hearings in which members of the community voiced 
their concerns about recombinant DNA and heard testimony from 
experts in the field describing the risks.301 The way in which the or-
dinance was conceived closely parallels the scenario endorsed by 
Green and Halvorsen302 who proposed a regulation process in which 
representatives of the community (in this case the Cambridge City 
Council) determine what level of risk their community is willing to 
bear after having heard the risks spelled out for them by technicians 
in the field. 303 Contrary to the NIH guidelines, in which risk assess-
ments were conducted by scientists without lay participation,304 the 
Cambridge ordinance reflects the lay community's perception of the 
level of risk they are willing to bear. 
The public continues to play an active role in the regulation of 
recombinant DNA work in Cambridge. As discussed previously, the 
monitoring component established by the ordinance is comprised of 
laymen.306 On October 28,1980, the CBC sponsored a public hearing 
to consider the plan of Biogen, Inc., a private recombinant DNA 
firm, to establish a commercial headquarters in East Cambridge. 306 
At the hearing, Dr. Andre Muller, Biogen's director of United States 
299. H.R. REP. No. 1005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
300. Id. pt. 1 at 27. 
30l. See supra text at notes 237-40. 
302. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra text at notes 219-23. 
304. See supra text at notes 199-200. 
305. See supra text at notes 278-79. 
306. Biogen is a Swiss, private, genetic engineering firm with plants in Geneva, London, 
and Zurich. 
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operations, was questioned at length by the CBC members as to the 
risk of their work and whether they contemplated any difficulty in 
complying with the ordinance.307 Area residents also testified, in-
cluding one East Cambridge woman who voiced strong opposition 
to, and fear of, Biogen's intentions to locate in her neighborhood.30B 
Following the hearing, the City Council recalled a special citizens 
committee to study the problem of private DNA firms locating in the 
city and asked them to submit policy recommendations to the City 
Manager.309 This study resulted in a revision of the ordinance 
tailored to the problems raised by the influx of private institutions. 
It is clear that the Cambridge ordinance has and continues to allow 
the public to participate in the regulation process in a meaningful 
way by enabling them to make their own assessments of the degree 
of risk they are willing to tolerate and by giving them responsibility 
for monitoring the research. These roles were denied to the public in 
the NIH guideline process.310 The residents of Cambridge should feel 
some psychological comfort in knowing that as the field of genetic 
research continues to expand, a mechanism is in place-a mechanism 
resulting from their own efforts-which affords them an opportunity 
to respond directly to potential or actual hazards presented by the 
technology. 
C. Summary of the Cambridge Ordinance 
A comparison of the NIH guidelines and the Cambridge ordinance 
indicates that the ordinance does successfully address many of the 
weaknesses in the guidelines. The ordinance brings all researchers-
public and private-under the scope of regulation.311 The monitoring 
of the ordinance is carried out by laymen,312 thus avoiding the con-
flict of interest inherent in the NIH framework in which scientists 
are asked to sponsor and police their colleagues.313 Unlike the NIH 
system, the ordinance's monitoring agency (the Cambridge 
Biohazards Committee) maintains frequent contact with the institu-
307. Dr. Muller responded that only PI experiments were contemplated at present and that 
he envisioned no problems in conforming to the requirements of the ordinance. Hearing at 
Cambridge City Hall, Oct. 28, 1980. 
308. The speaker was Mrs. Mary Nicoloro. 
309. The Committee recalled was the Cambridge Experimentation Review Board which 
assisted in the original drafting of the Cambridge Ordinance in 1976 and 1977. 
310. See supra text at notes 215-18. 
311. See supra text at notes 242-44. 
312. See supra text at notes 278-79. 
313. See supra text at notes 197-200. 
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tional biohazards committees.314 The passage and implementation of 
the ordinance has been characterized by active participation from 
the lay community.315 These improvements would seem to indicate 
that the Cambridge ordinance provides considerably more protection 
to its citizens from the hazards of recombinant DNA than that af-
forded by the NIH guidelines. 
At the same time, however, the ordinance in its application ap-
pears to exclude meaningful participation by the scientific com-
munity316 whose opinions are useful in identifying and quantifying 
recombinant DNA risks317 and in detecting violations of technical 
safety requirements. Additional participation by geneticists318 would 
result in more accurate assessments of the degree of regulation ap-
propriate to address the potential hazards and in more meticulous 
monitoring of the research. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recombinant DNA technology represents one of science's most ex-
citing and potentially useful discoveries. It offers the promise of the 
development of products and drugs to cure or control a variety of 
medical and social problems such as cancer, diabetes, and the energy 
shortage. The growth of the technology has been further enhanced 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty which 
will permit researchers to obtain patent protection for the forms of 
life they create in the laboratory through recombinant DNA tech-
mques. 
This research, however, can introduce serious hazards to society as 
well. There is widespread concern that recombinant DNA molecules 
will escape into the environment and, given the extent of the scien-
tific community's understanding of the technology at this time, there 
is no way of knowing how these molecules will react. Some scientists 
have predicted that the molecules will cause new diseases, new forms 
of cancer, and/or novel epidemics. 
The federal government's response to the potential hazards of the 
technology has been to promulgate research guidelines through the 
314. See supra text at notes 275-77. 
315. See supra text at notes 301-09. 
316. See supra text at notes 278-80. 
317. See supra text at note 223. 
318. A minority role is being advocated here, such as the placement of one geneticist among 
the CEC's five members, or contracting with scientists to conduct site inspections. See supra 
text at notes 296-98. 
78 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:37 
National Institutes of Health. These guidelines, however, do not pro-
vide communities with adequate protection. They do not apply to the 
private sector-where the vast majority of dollars are being spent to 
develop this new technology. Furthermore, the guidelines are 
hampered by a lack of public involvement and by a clear eonflict of 
interest within the NIH which is attempting to promote and police 
the research at the same time. 
Given the fact that recent congressional bills attempting to 
regulate the research have died before reaching the floor of Con-
gress and given President Reagan's traditional aversion to addi-
tional regulation over the private sector, it appears unlikely that the 
federal government will enact additional controls over the research 
in the near future. States and localities, therefore, who perceive that 
the hazards of recombinant DNA research are of concern to their 
communities will have to take the initiative in addressing the weak-
nesses in the NIH's regulatory framework. 
In considering local regulation, states and localities should con-
sider modeling their legislation after the Cambridge, Massachusetts 
recombinant DNA ordinance. The ordinance addresses the major in-
adequacies in the NIH guidelines by eliminating undesirable conflicts 
of interest within the monitoring process and by affording max-
imum public participation. Local legislators would be advised to in-
crease the role of experts in genetic research to insure informed deci-
sion making in carrying out the legislation. In sum, the Cambridge 
ordinance provides a good foundation for states and localities to 
build upon as they incorporate their own perception of what level 
of risk their communities are willing to bear in regard to recombi-
nant DNA technology. 
